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The world appears to be well described by gauge theories; why? I suggest that gauge is more than
mathematical redundancy. Gauge-dependent quantities can not be predicted, but there is a sense in
which they can be measured. They describe “handles” though which systems couple: they represent
real relational structures to which the experimentalist has access in measurement by supplying one
of the relata in the measurement procedure itself. This observation leads to a physical interpretation
for the ubiquity of gauge: it is a consequence of a relational structure of physical quantities.
I. INTRODUCTION
The year 2013 has been marked by two pieces of no-
table news from Nature: the CERN study of the Higgs
field [1, 2] and the Planck satellite’s observations of the
cosmic background radiation [3]. Both support, far be-
yond the expectations of many theorists, the effective-
ness of the current description of the world, based on the
standard model of particle physics and general relativity.
These two theories are, each in its own way, gauge theo-
ries. This was pointed out by Utiyama [4] shortly after
the writing of the Yang-Mills equations and was formal-
ized by Dirac [5]. Why is the world so well described by
gauge theories?1
Gauge theories are characterized by a local invariance,
which is often described as mathematical redundancy.
According to this interpretation, physics is coded into the
gauge-invariant aspects of the mathematics. This inter-
pretation obviously captures something important. Dirac
defines gauge as under-determination of the lagrangian
variables’ evolution, and observes that if evolution is de-
terministic, as we expect in the classical theory, then only
gauge-invariant quantities can be physical, by definition.2
But things are not so clear. If gauge is only mathe-
matical redundancy, why the common emphasis on the
importance of gauge symmetry? Why the idea that this
is a major discovery and guiding principle for understand-
ing particle physics? How did Einstein’s intuition about
covariance lead him to unraveling relativistic gravity?
In this paper, I observe that the interpretation of gauge
as pure mathematical redundancy disregards an aspect
of the physics. This aspect explains the effectiveness of
gauge theory, and helps us unravel the actual meaning of
the fact that the world is described by gauge theories.
1 For an interesting philosophical discussion of the problem, and
general references, see [6, 7].
2 This interpretation has gained support from recent results on the
possibility of computing amplitudes using methods that make
gauge look just like a complication [8], and by AdS/CFT sugges-
tions that gravitational physics can be coded on the asymptotic
boundary. In the quantum-gravity community, it grounds the
common idea that the space of solutions of the hamiltonian con-
straint exhausts the physics of a system.
The basic observation is that although we can interpret
a given physical system in terms of its gauge-invariant ob-
servables, we nevertheless couple this same system with
other systems using its non-gauge-invariant variables.3
I develop this observation and consider a consequent
general interpretation of the ubiquity of gauge in our
world. This leads to a different view of gauge-dependent
quantities, indicating that, in an appropriate sense, they
can be taken as unpredictable, but measurable.
II. COUPLING GAUGE SYSTEMS
A physical system can be considered in isolation or in
the way it couples with other systems.
Electromagnetism can be expressed as a U(1) gauge
theory for the Maxwell potential A.4 The gauge-invariant
content of the theory, whose evolution is predicted the
Maxwell equations, is captured by the electromagnetic
field F = dA.5 This leads us to say that what exists in
Nature is only the gauge invariant content of A. However,
we describe the coupling of the electromagnetic field with
a fermion field ψ in terms of the interaction lagrangian
density
L = ψ¯(γµAµ)ψ (1)
written in terms of A, not F . Similarly, we describe the
gravitational field with the metric tensor g, which trans-
forms under the gauge transformations of general rela-
tivity, namely diffeomorphisms. But the matter energy-
momentum tensor couples directly to g,
L =
√−g gµν Tµν , (2)
and not to a gauge-invariant function of g.
3 A related argument is Feynman’s suggestion ([9] II.15.3-4) that
we should take the Maxwell potential (a gauge-dependent quan-
tity) seriously on the ground that it determines the energy of a
current (it appears in a coupling).
4 Notation in this note is standard and can be found in all common
theoretical-physics textbooks.
5 Plus additional global quantities if the topology is non-trivial.
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But they are so in the coupled systems, formed by (A,ψ)
and (g,matter) respectively, where the gauge transfor-
mations act on all variables. The reason they are gauge-
invariant is not because they couple gauge-invariant
quantities. They are gauge-invariant couplings between
gauge-variant quantities.
If we consider the electromagnetic or gravitational
fields alone, or the system formed by coupling these to
the Dirac field or matter, then we can view gauge quan-
tities as a redundancy of the formalism. But if we think
in physical terms, we face an obvious ambiguity: if the
real electromagnetic field is purely described by F alone,
how can it couple to ψ? If the gravitational field is an
equivalence class of metrics under diffeos, how can this
couple locally to a particle? Where, so to say, does A go
when no fermion is around?
These considerations suggest that gauge non-invariant
quantities (“gauge variables”, from now on) represent, in
a sense, handles though which systems can couple.
III. A MODEL
In order to get some direct intuition about the nature
of gauge, consider a set of N variables xn(t), with n =
1...N whose dynamics is governed by the lagrangian
Lx =
1
2
N−1∑
n=1
(x˙n+1 − x˙n)2 . (3)
where x˙n ≡ dxn/dt. (A potential term depending on
differences could be added without affecting the following
discussion.) The equations of motion are invariant under
the gauge transformation
xn → x′n = xn + λ (4)
for an arbitrary function λ(t). This is a minimal proto-
type of a gauge system. The evolution of xn(t) is under-
determined by the equations of motion. A complete set
of gauge-invariant quantities is given by
an = xn+1 − xn, n = 1...N − 1, (5)
whose evolution is deterministic. According to a stan-
dard interpretation of this system, the lagrangian (3)
describes the variables (5) and nothing else; a gauge-
invariant description of the same system is given by the
lagrangian
L˜x =
1
2
N−1∑
n=1
a˙2n (6)
and the systems Lx and L˜x are equivalent. Are they
really?
Consider a second set of variables, yn(t) with n =
1...M whose dynamics is similarly governed by the la-
grangian
Ly =
1
2
M−1∑
n=1
(y˙n+1 − y˙n)2 . (7)
The equations of motion are invariant under the gauge
transformation
yn → y′n = yn + λ′ (8)
for an arbitrary function λ′(t). As before, we can de-
fine an equivalent L˜y system just in terms of the gauge-
invariant quantities bn = yn+1 − yn.
Now, consider the coupled system defined by the vari-
ables xn, yn and the lagrangian
L = Lx + Ly + Lint (9)
where
Lint =
1
2
(y˙1 − x˙N )2 . (10)
The coupled system is invariant under the gauge transfor-
mations (4) and (8) if λ(t) = λ′(t). Its gauge-invariant
observables are more than those of the individual sys-
tems: they are given by gauge-invariant observables of
the first system, those of the second, plus a new one:
c = y1 − xN , (11)
which depends on gauge variables of both.
Suppose we take the point of view that gauge is nothing
else than mathematical redundancy. If so, we should be
able to describe the above coupling of the two systems
Lx and Ly by directly coupling L˜x and L˜y, without need
of adding additional variables. But this is not possible.
We cannot obtain the coupled system (9) by coupling the
gauge-invariant systems L˜x and L˜y, because the number
of variables of these are (N − 1) + (M − 1) = N +M − 2,
while the degrees of freedom of the coupled system are
N +M − 1, that is, one more.
We can obtain L from L˜x and L˜y only by adding one
extra variable by hand. But this variable was indeed
already contained in the union of the Lx and Ly gauge
variables. This shows how gauge variables play a direct
physical role, when coupling systems. The system L˜x is
not equivalent to the system Lx because the second codes
information about possible couplings.
Thus, there is a precise sense in which L˜x and L˜y are
not equivalent to Lx and Ly: the equivalence holds only
as long as we consider a systems in isolation; it fails when
the possibility of coupling is considered.
IV. RELATIVE OBSERVABLES
The variable c defined in (11) is a “relative observable”,
in the sense that it is not a function of the sole variables
3of one single system. It captures –so to say– something
about the value of a gauge variable of one of the two
systems, y1, “relative” to the value of one gauge variable
of the other, xN .
6
It is enlightening to make the example above more tan-
gible by imagining a concrete situation it could describe.
Imagine a simple world where there are only N space-
ships capable of measuring their relative distances. The
position xn(t) of one individual spaceship cannot be de-
termined in absolute terms, because there is nothing else
with respect to which it can be determined. This is why
the equations of motion leave it free. The relative po-
sitions can be measured and they obey the equations of
motions determined by the theory (3).
Now imagine that a fleet of alien starships approaches
from far away, described by the theory (7). As the two
fleets starts communicating, one new observable appears:
the position of y1 with respect to xN .
In the example, gauge-invariant degrees of freedom are
relational observables, relating variables that in the ab-
sence of coupling are gauge degrees of freedom.
The gauge invariance of Lx is invariance under an arbi-
trary time-dependent displacement of all spaceships. The
position of the individual ships is redundant in the the-
ory insofar as we measure only relative distances among
these. But in the physical world each ship has a position
nevertheless: this becomes meaningful with respect to
one additional ship, as this appears. In other words, the
existence of a gauge expresses the fact that a reference
is needed to measure the position of a ship. It expresses
the fact that we measure position relationally.
I suggests that this is the general case for all gauge
systems.
The fact that the world is well described by gauge the-
ories expresses the fact that the quantities we deal with
in the world are generally quantities that pertain to rela-
tions between different parts of the world, that is, which
are defined across subsystems.7
The example shows how a gauge quantity typically de-
scribes an individual component of a relative observables.
6 In fact, all the variables of the system (9) are of the same form.
The system can be rewritten in the form
L =
1
2
N+M−1∑
n=1
(z˙n+1 − z˙n) . (12)
where xn = zn and yn = zn+N , which in turn can be split into
two subsystems at any value of n, showing that any of its gauge
invariant variables
dn = zn+1 − zn n = 1, ..., N + M − 1. (13)
is a relative observable, in the sense above. Thus, all gauge-
invariant degrees of freedom of this system have such a relational
character.
7 Of course the Yang-Mills connection connects the internal frame
orientations of two points of spacetime and the metric expresses
the distance between two points of spacetime.
A. General relativity
Let me now apply the idea illustrated above to the real
world. General relativity is invariant under the transfor-
mation
gµν(x)→ g′µν(x) =
∂fρ(x)
∂xµ
∂fσ(x)
∂xν
gρσ(f
−1(x)). (14)
of the metric tensor, which is a gauge transformation
in the sense of Dirac, and implies under-determination
of the evolution of the metric under Einstein equations.
Gauge-invariant quantities in pure GR are invariant un-
der the transformation above. A function of the metric
such as
τ =
∫ 1
0
dτ
√
g00(τ, 0, 0, 0). (15)
fails to be gauge-invariant.
Consider the system formed by GR and two parti-
cles described by the worldlines xµ(τ) and yµ(τ). These
transform under gauge transformations as
xµ(τ)→ x′µ(τ) = fµ(X(τ)). (16)
and similarly for yµ(τ). Suppose for simplicity that we
consider only solutions where the two worldlines meet at
two points P and Q. Let T be the proper time from P
to Q along the worldline of the first particle.
T =
∫ Q
P
dτ
√
gµν(x(τ))
dxµ(τ)
dτ
dxν(τ)
dτ
. (17)
The quantity T is a gauge-invariant quantity of the cou-
pled system formed by pure general relativity and the
two particles.
In fact, it can be measured and predicted: if the first
of the two particles is the Sun and second is the Halley
comet, then T ∼ 75 years, as was indeed predicted by
Edmond Halley.
Does this observable T pertain to the gravitational field
or to the particles? The answer is clearly to both. It is a
relational observable in the sense above. It is the analog
of the observable c in (11). It measures a line integral of
the gravitational field along a worldline determined by a
particle. Neither the position of the participle nor this
line integral in the absence of the particles are gauge-
invariant.
B. Yang-Mills
The physical meaning of the gauge invariance of gen-
eral relativity is easier to understand than that of Yang-
Mills theory. The gauge invariance of general relativity
is the implementation of a physical idea: localization is
entirely relative (hence the name “general relativity”).
Localization is always determined with respect to some-
thing else, in particular for instance with respect to the
4gravitational field. We understand the gauge invariance
of the theory as a realization of the idea of relative observ-
ables: the position of the particle in the above example
makes sense only in relation to the gravitational field,
and the value of the gravitational field at a point makes
sense only in so far as there is something physical with
respect to which that point is defined. This is the bread
and butter of every general relativist.
The physical meaning of the Yang-Mills gauge invari-
ance, I think, can be understood similarly. To illustrate
it, the most transparent example is the original SU(2)
theory of Yang and Mills [10], with two fermions p and
n (erroneously identified with proton and neutron at the
time) in a multiplet. The local SU(2) gauge symmetry
of the theory transforms the non-abelian gauge field A as
well as the fermion’s fields.
Suppose we observe one fermion at a point x. Can we
say if it is a p particle or an n particle? The answer of
course is subtle. A priori, there is nothing that distin-
guishes the two, so, observing one particle we can arbi-
trarily call it p or n as we wish. But once one particle has
been named, any other particle at a point y connected
by a given path γ to the first is uniquely determined as a
given combination of p and n. This is, of course, because
the gauge field defines a parallel transport operator along
the path, which allows for the angle between the two par-
ticles’ states ψx and ψy in the internal space to be well
defined with respect to one another. In other words, the
quantity
θ = 〈ψx|Pe
∫
γ
A|ψy〉 (18)
is gauge invariant. Here we see again how a gauge invari-
ant quantity is a relational quantity, relating gauge field
variables and two gauge fermion variables. The nature
of a particle, whether it is p or n, is something which
is defined in relation to the field and other particles, in
the same manner in which a direction in spacetime is
only defined with respect to the gravitational field and
something else.
These relations are cleanly expressed in the geometri-
cal representation of Yang-Mills theory in terms of fiber
bundles [11]. In this geometrical picture, the connection
is a field that establishes a preferred relation between a
frame in a fiber and a frame in a nearby fiber. In other
words, it is a quintessential relational observable. Gauge
invariance is then the freedom of choosing a frame in each
fiber.
This geometrical language emphasizes the similarity
between Yang-Mills theory and general relativity. In
both cases gauge invariance is a matter of arbitrary coor-
dinates. As I emphasize below, in both cases the choice
of a particular gauge can be realized physically via a cou-
pling: with a material reference systemic general relativ-
ity, with the choice of reference fermions in Yang Mills
theory. Therefore the geometry of the bundle describes
the possibility of coupling for the gauge field.
Gauge theories are sometime introduced mentioning
the historical idea of promoting a global symmetry to a
local one. The purpose of the field would be to realize the
local symmetry.8 This idea, however, leaves the question
I am addressing in this note open: why do we need to
describe the world with local symmetries if we then in-
terpret these symmetries as mathematical redundancy?
C. Time as gauge
The last example of gauge quantity I examine, before
discussing observability of these quantities in general, is
that generated by the hamiltonian constraint of a co-
variant theory [5]. It is a well-known observation that
any standard hamiltonian system can be reformulated
as a gauge system with vanishing hamiltonian. A con-
ventional Newtonian system with N variables qn(t) and
lagrangian
L(qn, q˙n) =
N∑
n=1
q˙2n
2
− V (qn). (19)
is equivalently described by the N + 1 variables
(t(τ), qn(τ)) and lagrangian
L˜(t, qn, t˙, q˙n) =
N∑
n=1
q˙2n
2t˙
− t˙ V (qn). (20)
where now the dot indicates the derivative with respect
to a new lagrangian evolution parameter τ . This theory
is invariant under the gauge transformations
qn(τ)→ q′n(τ) = qn(λ(τ)) (21)
t(τ)→ t′(τ) = t(λ(τ)) (22)
for an arbitrary function λ(τ). The physical interpre-
tation of the variable t is transparent: it is simply the
time t of the original theory (hence the same name), pro-
moted to a full fledged lagrangian variable t(τ), in a the-
ory where the new lagrangian evolution parameter τ is
now a pure-gauge quantity.
The relational aspect of the gauge is manifest in this
case: the gauge-invariant content of this system is in the
relative evolution of qn and t. The quantities qn(τ) and
t(τ), taken individually, are gauge variables. Evolution
in the lagrangian evolution-parameter τ is pure gauge.
The hamiltonian turns out to be weakly vanishing. The
8 I have always found this story a bit mysterious. Entities in Na-
ture are not there to realize purposes: they are there and have
properties. The Yang-Mills field is there and has symmetries; it
is not there for the purpose of implementing a symmetry. We
should distinguish our understanding of Nature from the path
of discovery. If we understand that large wild mammals have
disappeared from America because of human hunting, we should
not conclude that humans exists for the purpose of exterminating
mammals.
5physical evolution is coded in the relative evolution of all
lagrangian variables.9
Notice that we are used to considering the quantities
qn as observables, but also to assuming that the time t
can be determined by simply looking at a clock. But here
the clock plays precisely the role of the position of the
alien starship above. That is, the temporal evolution of
the quantity qn is well defined only in so far as we can
measure it with respect to a clock variable t. The gauge-
invariant observable is not qn, it is qn(t) at some observed
time t. The quantities qn and t, taken individually, have
no determined dynamics.
The indeterminacy associated to the gauge freedom is
concretely realized by the fact that (while the value of
other variables at some time can be predicted) the value
of the clock variable itself can not be predicted.10
V. OBSERVABILITY OF GAUGE VARIABLES
I now come to a key point of this discussion: the mea-
surability of gauge variables. In physics, when we talk
about measurement, we refer to an interaction between
a measured system S and a measuring apparatus O.
For a system S with gauges, nothing prevents us from
measuring a property of a system S by means of a (gauge-
invariant) interaction between a gauge variable of S and
a gauge variable of O.
When we do so, we can determine a number for a gauge
variable of the system S. That is, we can “measure” a
gauge variable (below are several examples). But this
number cannot be predicted by the dynamical equations
of the system S. Quantities that can be measured but
not predicted were denoted “partial observables” in [13].
The conclusion that gauge-variables can be measured
does not contradict Dirac’s original argument according
to which considering a gauge variable as “observable”
leads to indeterminism. In fact, it confirms it. Dirac
used “observable” in the sense of predictable quantity.
We can turn Dirac’s argument around: every time that
the physics is such that a certain measurable quantity
entering the description of a system is unpredictable in
terms of the system’s dynamics alone (like the time, or
the position of a single starship), it must be described in
the formalism by a gauge variable. This is what gauge
variables are.
9 Physics is about relations and this is implemented in the stan-
dard dynamics, which codes relations between values of physi-
cal variables –including t– or, equivalently, the evolution of all
variables in a single variable (t) taken as reference. A detailed
discussion of this point is in Section 3.2.4 of [12].
10 This interpretation of the relation between gauge and time evo-
lution is reinforced by the analysis of the coupling of general-
covariant systems developed in [? ]. When coupling general-
covariant systems, one finds systems of hamiltonian constraints
generating multi-dimensional orbits. If the physics singles out a
preferred time variable, the others independent variables appear
as gauges. See [? ].
This happens often in the real world. For instance, a
gravitational wave detector measures some components
of the metric field. By themselves these components are
not gauge invariant, but they correspond to a gauge-
invariant observable of the field+detector system.
Again, in general relativity we can label the points
along a worldline with the proper time τ from an initial
event. As long as no other event is singed out, τ is a gauge
variable, because we do not know where we are along the
worldline when we measure it. But if we have a second
similar gauge variable, the combination of the two gives
a gauge-invariant quantity. For instance, say I keep a
precise clock in my hands and throw upward a similar
clock, which then falls down. When the two clocks meet
again, the one in my hand will be late with respect to the
one in free fall. Given initial data, the theory predicts the
reading of the free falling clock τ(τ ′) as a function of the
time τ ′ of the clock in my hands. Equivalently, it gives
τ ′(τ). The two quantities τ and τ ′ are gauge variables,
while the value of one at a given value of the other is
a gauge-invariant quantity. They are both measurable.
But only their relative value is predictable.
A particularly clarifying example is provided by the
local SO(3, 1) gauge invariance of the tetrad formula-
tion of general relativity. On the one hand, the local
SO(3, 1) gauge transformations are mathematical redun-
dancy, since (at least in the absence of fermions) the the-
ory can equally be formulated in terms of tetrads or in
terms of the metric. But on the other hand, the tetrad
components have a transparent physical interpretation,
since they can be viewed as axes of a concrete material
physical system realized for instance by our laboratory.
The tetrad components are often concretely used in this
manner in practical applications of the theory. How can
something be mathematical redundancy and at the same
time concretely determined?
The answer is that when we couple general relativity
to the matter of a material reference system, the compo-
nents of the gravitational field with respect to the direc-
tions defined by this system are gauge-invariant quanti-
ties of the coupled system; but they are gauge-dependent
quantities of the gravitational field, measured with re-
spect to a given external frame.
Similarly, a detector that recognizes the p particle in
the original Yang Mills theory is in principle possible;
what it is actually measuring is the angle in internal space
between the measured particle and a p standard in the
detector itself.
Suppose we have several apparatus that measure
whether particles are p particles or n particles, with re-
spect to a local standard particle defined as p. In each
there is a fermion, and a way to measure the (gauge-
invariant) angle θ in internal space, given in (18), be-
tween an incoming particle and this reference fermion.
Say the apparatus are at the boundary of a process. The
result of one measurement is unpredictable because it de-
pends on the (arbitrary, as far as the system’s dynamics
is concerned) state of one reference fermion in the appa-
6ratus. Notice the similarity between this situation and
the ships: the internal state of each fermion is determined
only with respect to another one, like the position of the
ships is determined with respect to another one.
Finally, the prototypical example of a partial observ-
able is time: a quantity that we routinely determine
(looking at a clock) but we can not predict from the dy-
namics of the system.
There is a common idea that one can restrict the for-
mulation of a general covariant system with vanishing
hamiltonian to its physical space Γph, and ignore its par-
tial observables, since they are non-gauge-invariant. The
problem with this idea is that if we do so, we have then to
recover missing structure in a convoluted manner. Take
a harmonic oscillator formulated as a re-parametrization
invariant system on a two-dimensional extended configu-
ration space with coordinates (q, t) and Hamiltonian con-
straint C = pt +
1
2 (p
2
q + q
2) = 0. The space Γph is the
space of the orbits of C in the C = 0 surface. It is a two-
dimensional space, with coordinates (A, φ), and is blind
to the physics of the oscillator. This physics can be ex-
pressed by considering gauge-invariant observables such
as the evolving constants of the motion qτ = A sin(τ +φ)
labelled by a parameter τ [14]; but this is a baroquism,
which rephrases the fact that the physics is not in Γph
alone: it requires additional structure. In fact, it is in
the relation between the points in Γph and the partial
observables q and t. The partial observables are relevant
because we have measuring devices to determine them.
The relevant solutions of the dynamical equations are,
for each point (A, φ) in Γph, relations between the par-
tial observables (q, t), such as
f(q, t;A, φ) = q −A sin(t+ φ) = 0. (23)
(The full description of this formulation is for instance in
Chapter 3 of [12].) Ignoring the role of partial observables
complicates the matter pointlessly.
Gauge quantities cannot be predicted, but can often
be measured. They measure our localization in time, our
orientation in general relativistic space, in the internal
space, and similar.11
VI. BOUNDARY FORMALISM
We can formalize the observations in the previous sec-
tion by using the covariant form of the dynamics [12]
11 The fact that a gauge variable can be measured even though
it cannot be predicted is not a paradox and it does not imply
that a gauge theory is useless because it is unable to predict the
results of possible measurements. Any use of a physical theory, in
fact, includes predictable quantities and unpredictable ones. The
last can be identified with those determination the measurement
location. The main example is time: we look at the clock to
read what time is it, and then we may predict the value of some
variable at that time. A theory can be useful and predictive even
if it does not predict at which time we are going to look at the
clock.
based on the boundary formalism [15]. Let us start with
a simple Newtonian system with degrees of freedom qn
evolving in the time t. We measure qn, the momenta pn
and t at initial and final boundaries of a process, and call
(qin, p
i
n, t
i) and (qfn, p
f
n, t
f ) the outcomes. The dynamical
equations determine constraints among these quantities.
If the initial values are known, the final values are not
all determined: in particular, we can take tf to be un-
predictable, and the other final quantities, (qfn, p
f
n) to be
determined as functions of tf .
Now imagine that there is also a local SU(2) gauge
invariance relevant in the experiment, and let’s disregard
spacial dependence for simplicity. Then in addition to
the above data each degree of freedom has a component,
say θin and θ
f
n in internal space, which can be measured
with respect to a given reference fermion at initial and
final times. Since the relative orientation of the reference
fermions is not a priori known, one of the angles θfn is
not determined by the dynamics of the process. As far as
the dynamics of the process is concerned, it is arbitrary.
Final variables are therefore functions of time and this
arbitrary angle.
Notice that the internal gauge dependence has the
same formal structure as time. In the hamiltonian for-
malism, both can be expressed by a constraint: the
gauge-constraint for the internal gauge and the hamilto-
nian constraint for the time dependence. In both cases,
we can associate measurement procedures to gauge vari-
ables at the boundary of a process. These are realized by
gauge-invariant interactions between a gauge variable of
the system and a gauge variable of the apparatus.
This shows that the the hamiltonian constraint and
the other constraints can be treated on equal footing: in
both cases, they determine dynamical constraints among
non-gauge-invariant observables, or partial observables,
measured at the boundaries of a process.
In the canonical framework, the Yang-Mills constraint
dictates how variables change with respect to a change of
the internal boundary frame. The diffeomorphism con-
straint dictates how variables change with respect to a
change in the location of the spatial boundary reference
frame. The hamiltonian constraint dictates how all vari-
ables collectively change with respect to a change in the
temporal location of the boundary, in particular with re-
spect to the variable used as clock. These constraints
code the full content of our dynamical theory.
In all cases, indeterminacy in some variables is due to
the arbitrariness of the choice of the internal frame, the
spacial reference, or the time of the measurement. Dy-
namics is the study of relations between partial observ-
ables, which are, in general, gauge-dependent quantities
of a system to which we can couple an apparatus.12
12 This raises an intriguing question in the quantum context. In
quantum theory we compute probabilities for outcomes when a
system S interacts with an “apparatus” O. According to the
7VII. CONCLUSIONS
The idea that gauge-variant quantities must be seen
uniquely as mathematical redundancy in the description
of physics, deprived on any physical meaning, misses an
aspect of Nature. It refers to systems in isolation, disre-
garding the fact that systems can couple via non-gauge-
invariant quantities. Gauge variables are components of
relational observables which depend on more than a sin-
gle component.
Gauge-variable quantities can be associated to mea-
surement procedures, although procedures that lead to
unpredictable numbers (“partial observables”). This is
true in general relativity and Yang Mills theory, and in
the general-covariant formulation of dynamics where the
time variable is an example of partial observable.
In particular, gauge-dependent quantities can be effec-
tively used for describing the way a system affects an
apparatus. Examples are: a material reference system
for the diffeomorphism gauge; a local Lorentz frame in
the tetrad formulation of general relativity; a reference
fermion in the Yang-Mills internal space; and a clock,
for the gauge associated to the hamiltonian constraint.
The coupling to the apparatus is gauge invariant, but
the measured quantity, viewed as a variable of the sys-
tem alone, is not.
The thesis of this paper is not that restricting to gauge-
invariant observables is wrong. We can always enlarge a
system to include any other coupled system and appara-
tus. (At least as long as we disregard quantum theory. In
quantum theory a notion of measurement might be un-
avoidable. According to many interpretations, if not all,
a split of the world into “system” and “observer” is neces-
sary to associate a value to physical quantities.) The the-
sis of this paper is that restringing to gauge-invariant ob-
servables makes us blind to a fine structure of the world.
Gauge invariance is not just mathematical redundancy;
it is an indication of the relational character of fundamen-
tal observables in physics. These do not refer to proper-
ties of a single entity. They refer to relational properties
between entities: relative velocity, relative localization,
relative orientation in internal space, and so on.13
Gauge interactions describe the world because Nature
is described by relative quantities that refer to more than
one object. In a sense, this is a step along the direction
devised by Galileo, when he stressed that velocity is a
quantity that does not refer to a single object, but to
two objects: the velocity of an object is only defined in
relation to another object.
Gauge is ubiquitous. It is not unphysical redundancy
of our mathematics. It reveals the relational structure of
our world.
***
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